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Abstract 
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1 Introduction
In nearly all developed, capitalistic economies, a majority of the large companies undertake
limited liability while only a small minority of partnerships undertake unlimited liability as
a form of business organization. According to the National Tax Agency (2012), there were
6872 companies in Japan in FY2010 with capital greater than 1 billion yen, 6222 of which
had limited liability (6212 corporations, 10 companies with limited liability), only 3 had un-
limited liability (none with general partnerships, 3 with limited partnerships), and 647 other
business organizations. According to the Monopolkommission (2012, p. 124), in 2010, the
Germany’s 100 largest companies consisted of 80 limited liability entities (67 corporations, 7
limited liability companies, 6 Societas Europaea (European companies)), 13 unlimited liabil-
ity entities (0 general partnership, 11 limited partnerships, 2 limited partnerships by shares),
and 7 other business organizations. Spulber (2009, pp. 264-65) reported that corporations
earn nearly 85% of the total revenues of all ﬁrms (including partnership and sole propri-
etorship) per year; however, their share of the number of total ﬁrms is roughly 19% in the
United States. 1 This implies that large American companies primarily adopt corporations
as their business organizational form.
This study raises the question as to why nearly all business entities, especially large-size
corporations, choose limited liability as a form of their business organization. No theoretical
article has addressed this issue to our knowledge; however, numerous articles deal with
the relationship between ﬁnancial structure and product market competition. 2 This study
focuses on the two types of business organization: (1)a limited liability entity and (2) an
unlimited liability entity. It examines which form of business organization do quantity-
setting oligopolists select under an extended and modiﬁed version of the Brander and Lewis
(1986) model.
A two-stage game is constructed: In the ﬁrst stage, each of the ﬁrms simultaneously and
1There are three main ﬁnancial structure: corporation, partnership, and sole proprietorship in the United
States. Corporation only adopts limited liability. See Spulber(2009, p. 264) in detail.
2For example, Brander and Lewis (1986); Showalter (1995); Hughes, Kao, and Mukherji (1998); Wanzenried
(2003); and Franck and Le Pape (2008) have studied oligopolistic competition. See Neff (2003) for a detailed
survey of related articles.
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independently chooses to be either an entitywith limited liability or an entitywith unlimited
liability. In the second stage, each ﬁrm engages in Cournot competition. We determine that
when an unlimited liability entity is viable, each ﬁrm adopts entities with limited liability as
a form of business organization, and an industry consisting of entities with limited liability
is socially optimal.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our model. In Section
3, we examine the endogenous determination of the form of business organization. Section
4 addresses the optimal industry structure determining the forms of business organization,
and ﬁnally, section 5 presents concluding remarks.
2 The Model
We consider an industry with N(≥ 2) risk-neutral ﬁrms. N is assumed to be ﬁxed. Each ﬁrm
produces a homogeneous product. Firm i(= 1, ..., N)’s cost function is c(qi) = cqi, where c is
the constant marginal cost, and qi is a ﬁrm i’s quantity supplied. Each ﬁrm assumes a linear
inverse demand function with uncertainty 3 :
p = p(z;Q) = a+ z− Q (1)
where p is the market price, a represents a demand parameter, Q(= ∑Ni=1 qi) is the total out-
put, and z is a random variable uniformly distributed in the interval [−z, z] with a density
function,
φ(z) =
1
2z¯
, for z ∈ [−z¯, z¯] (2)
= 0, otherwise.
A two-stage game is constructed: In the ﬁrst stage, each ﬁrm simultaneously yet inde-
pendently chooses either a limited liability organizational form labeled L or an unlimited
liability organizational form labeled U. In the second stage, each ﬁrm competes a` la Cournot
in the product market.
3The following speciﬁcation is also used in Hughes, Kao, and Mukherji (1998).
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3 The Equilibrium
3.1 The Second-Stage Subgame
We solve the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the game by backward induction. Con-
sider the second stage of the game. Suppose n ∈ [0, N] ﬁrms are limited liability ﬁrms,
while the remaining m(= N − n) ﬁrms are unlimited liability ﬁrms in the same industry.
It is neither a right nor an obligation of a limited liability ﬁrm to pay its factors of produc-
tion. If a limited liability ﬁrm consistently earns non-negative realized proﬁts, it makes full
payment to its input factor. Otherwise, it may pay the factors the realized revenue, which is
lesser than its total cost. According to Brander and Lewis (1986) and John et al. (2005), each
limited liability ﬁrm maximizes its expected proﬁt:
πLi =
∫ z
zˆ
(a+ z− Q− c)qLi
1
2z
dz, (3)
where zˆ is the critical value of z; a stage at which this ﬁrm earns zero proﬁt, that is, a break-
even point
a+ zˆ− Q− c = 0, (4)
and qLi is the individual output of limited liability ﬁrm i. When z ≥ (resp. <)zˆ, the ﬁrm
makes non-negative (resp. negative) proﬁt. zˆ must lie within [−z¯, z¯]. Henceforth, we assume
that a− c = 1 for simplicity. From (4), we derive the ﬁrst-order condition for expected-proﬁt
maximization
∂πLi
∂qLi
=
∫ z¯
zˆ
(1+ z− Q− qLi )
1
2z¯
dz− (1+ zˆ− Q) 1
2z
· ∂zˆ
∂qLi
= (z¯− zˆ)
(
1− Q− qLi + 12 (z¯+ zˆ)
) 1
2z¯
= 0. (5)
If ﬁrm i chooses qi such that z¯− zˆ = 0, then its expected proﬁt is null from (3). Therefore, qLi
such that z¯ − zˆ = 0 is not an equilibrium individual output even if the condition z¯ − zˆ = 0
satisﬁes (5). Thus, an equilibrium individual output satisﬁes
1− Q− qLi + 12 (z¯+ zˆ) = 0. (6)
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In contrast, it is both a right and an obligation of an unlimited liability ﬁrm to pay its
factor of production, because owners’ personal assets are not protected by a legal contract.
Therefore, owners must make full payment to its input factor even if the ﬁrm earns negative
realized proﬁt. Following John et al. (2005), the expected proﬁt of an unlimited liability ﬁrm
j πUj is deﬁned as
πUj =
∫ z¯
−z¯
(a+ z− Q− c)qUj
1
2z
dz, (7)
where qUj shows the output of the unlimited liability ﬁrm j. The ﬁrst-order condition for
expected-proﬁt maximization is given by
∂πUj
∂qUj
= 0 : 1− Q− qUj = 0. (8)
From (4), (5), and (8), we have equilibrium individual output and equilibrium total out-
put
qL =
1
2(N + 1)− n [1+ (N + 1− n)z¯], (9a)
qU =
1
2(N + 1)− n [2− nz¯], (9b)
Q =
1
2(N + 1)− n [(2N − n) + nz¯]. (9c)
To ensure the viability of an unlimited liability ﬁrm, that is, qU ≥ 0 for any n ≤ N, the
following assumption is derived from (9b):
Assumption 1
z¯ ≤ 2N .
We also impose the assumption ensuring that zˆ falls in [−z¯, z¯].
Assumption 2
z¯ > 1N+1 .
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Because 2N >
1
N+1 holds, the above assumptions are consistent. Direct evaluation yields the
following lemma.
4From (4), (9c), and Assumption 1, we have zˆ = Q − 1 = nz¯−22(N+1)−n ≤ 0, meaning that zˆ < z¯. Therefore, to
guarantee that −z¯ < zˆ, the condition that z¯ > 1N+1 must hold. If zˆ < −z¯ holds, the limited liability ﬁrms are
essentially reduced to unlimited liability ﬁrms.
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Lemma 1
Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, the limited liability ﬁrm always produces greater
output than the unlimited liability ﬁrm.
Equation (6) shows that marginal revenue of limited liability ﬁrm, MRL = a + 12 (z¯ + zˆ)−
Q− qLi equals its marginal cost c, while (8) that that of unlimited one, MRU = a+ 12 −Q− qUj
is equal to c. Because MRL > MRU for the same output level, limited liability ﬁrm behaves
more aggressively than unlimited liability one.
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, expected equilibrium proﬁt of both limited and unlimited
liability ﬁrms can be written as follows.
πL =
1
z¯
(qL)3, (10a)
πU = (qU)2.5 (10b)
From (9), we obtain
∂qL
∂n
=
1− (N + 1)z¯
(2(N + 1)− n)2 , (11a)
∂qU
∂n
=
2(1− (N + 1)z¯)
(2(N + 1)− n)2 , (11b)
∂Q
∂n
=
2((N + 1)z¯− 1)
(2(N + 1)− n)2 . (11c)
From (10), therefore, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2
Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. An increase in the number of limited liability
ﬁrms n reduces the individual output of both, a limited liability ﬁrm as well as an unlimited
liability one, but it enhances the total output. This implies that the aggregate output of
unlimited liability ﬁrms decreases.
The limited liability ﬁrm behaves more aggressive than the unlimited liability ﬁrm as shown
in Lemma 1. As the number of (aggressive) limited liability ﬁrms n increases in the industry,
the competitiveness in the industry also increases.
5Detailed calculation is given in Appendix A.
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3.2 The First-Stage Subgame
Let us return to the ﬁrst stage. Anticipating equilibrium in the second stage, each ﬁrm has
no incentive to change its type of ﬁnancial status in the ﬁrst stage. The sub-game perfect
Nash equilibrium industry conﬁguration (ne,me) is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1
An industry conﬁguration (ne,me) is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if the conﬁgu-
ration satisﬁes
(i) ne +me = N for ne ≥ 0 and me ≥ 0,
(ii) πL(ne,me) ≥ πU(ne − 1,me + 1),
(iii) πU(ne,me) ≥ πL(ne + 1,me − 1).
From (10a), (10b), and Deﬁnition 1 we establish the following proposition.
Proposition 1
Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. The industry conﬁguration (N, 0) is a unique Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 1 states that when both limited liability and unlimited liability ﬁrms are viable,
every ﬁrm that can choose its business organizational form becomes an entity with limited
liability. The reason is that a limited liability ﬁrm is more proﬁtable than an unlimited lia-
bility ﬁrm because the former behaves more aggressively than the latter as show in Lemma
1.
Considering that all ﬁrms in the same industry are unlimited liability ﬁrms, each ﬁrm
has the incentive to switch from being an unlimited liability entity to a limited liability en-
tity; this shift permits it to be proﬁtable by expanding its output. Therefore, the industry
conﬁguration consisting solely of unlimited liability ﬁrms is not stable. Since this shift is
proﬁtable for all unlimited liability ﬁrms in the industry, the industry conﬁguration that
includes unlimited liability ﬁrms is also unstable.
Considering that all ﬁrms in the same industry are limited liability ﬁrms, no ﬁrm in this
situation has the incentive to shift from being a limited liability entity; this shift reduces
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proﬁts because of its reducing output. Thus, the industry conﬁguration consisting solely of
limited liability ﬁrms is stable.
4 Efﬁcient Industry Conﬁguration
In this section, we examine what constitutes a welfare-maximizing industry conﬁguration.
Now considering that n ﬁrms with limited liability and m(= N − n) ﬁrms with unlimited
liability coexist in the industry, we examine the second-best policy in the sense that a social
planner can solely control the number of ﬁrms with limited and unlimited liability, but can-
not control each ﬁrm’s output decision. We construct a two-stage game: In the ﬁrst stage,
the social planner determines the number of limited liability ﬁrms n to maximize (expected)
social surpluses. Given the liability rule, each ﬁrm engages in Cournot competition in the
second stage.
The expected social surplus is deﬁned as a sum of consumer surplus, total proﬁts of
unlimited liability ﬁrms, total proﬁt of limited liability ﬁrms, and the social cost caused by
the decision of limited liability. Because second-stage equilibrium outcomes can be regarded
as a function of the number of limited liability ﬁrms n from (10), expected social surplus can
be expressed as
W(n) =
∫ z¯
−z¯
[∫ Q(n)
0
p(s; z)ds− p(Q(n); z)Q(n)
]
1
2z¯
dz
+ (N − n) ·
[∫ z¯
−z¯
{
p(Q(n); z)qU(n)− cqU(n)
} 1
2z¯
dz
]
+ n
[∫ z¯
zˆ
{
p(Q(n); z)qL(n)− cqL(n)
} 1
2z¯
dz
]
+ n
[∫ zˆ
−z¯
{
p(Q(n); z)qL(n)− cqL(n)
} 1
2z¯
dz
]
. (12)
The ﬁrst-order condition for welfare maximization is given by
W ′(n) = (a− c− Q(n))∂Q(n)
∂n
= (1− Q(n))∂Q(n)
∂n
(13)
from (12). 6 Because zˆ = Q(n)− 1 is the nonpositive from Assumption 1, the sign of W ′(n)
6Note that welfare can be transformed into
W(n) =
∫ z¯
−z¯
[∫ Q(n)
0
p(s; z)ds− cQ(n)
]
1
2z¯
dz.
Differentiating the above equation with respect to n, we can easily obtain (13).
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depends on ∂Q(n)∂n . Because
∂Q(n)
∂n > 0 from Lemma 2, thus, the following proposition is
established.
Proposition 2
Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. The efﬁcient industry conﬁguration (n∗,m∗) is
(N, 0).
Proposition 2 states that welfare is maximized when an industry conﬁguration comprises
only of limited liability entities.
In an economy with linear demand and cost functions, an increase in the total output
brings about welfare improvement. As previously mentioned, a limited liability ﬁrm is
more aggressive than an unlimited liability ﬁrm for its quantity setting. Now considering
that all ﬁrms are unlimited liability ﬁrms, the ﬁrm’s switching from unlimited liability to
limited liability enhances the level of welfare; thus, when all ﬁrms become limited liability
ﬁrms welfare is maximized.
Propositions 1 and 2 help establish the following proposition.
Proposition 3
The equilibrium industry conﬁguration is efﬁcient in the second-best sense.
5 Concluding Remarks
In the real world, most large ﬁrms select limited liability as their business organizational
form. To explain this fact, we construct a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, each oligopolistic
ﬁrm simultaneously and independently chooses to be either an entity with limited liability
or an entity with unlimited liability. Each of them behaves in a Cournot fashion in the second
stage. The following conclusions are established. (1) Even if an unlimited liability ﬁrm is
viable, all ﬁrms select limited liability entities. (2) The equilibrium industry conﬁguration
where all ﬁrms become limited liability entities is socially efﬁcient in the second-best sense.
Suggested directions for further research are as follows, (1) Alter the competition mode
from quantity to price competition: In price competition with product differentiation, a lim-
ited liability ﬁrm may be less aggressive than an unlimited liability ﬁrm. If so, the results
9
may change in a price-setting oligopoly. (2) Introduce institutional differences among coun-
tries: For example a general partnership, which is an unlimited liability entity, has no ju-
ridical personality in the United States whereas it does in Japan. This situation means that
a general partnership may not have to pay corporate tax in the United States, although it is
a mandatory payment in Japan. This difference affects the choice of either limited or unlim-
ited liability entity.
Appendix A: The Derivation of (10)
We can transform (3) into
πL =
∫ z
zˆ
(1+ z− Q)qL 1
2z
dz
= (1− Q)(z¯− zˆ)qL 12z¯ +
1
2
(z¯2 − zˆ2)qL 12z¯
=
1
2z¯
(z¯− zˆ)qL
(
1− Q+ 1
2
(z¯+ zˆ)
)
. (A1)
Considering (6), we can rearrange (A1) as
πL =
1
2z¯
(z¯− zˆ)q2L. (A2)
From (4) and (6), we have qL = 12 (z¯− zˆ). Therefore, we can transform (A2) into (10a).
We can also transform (7) into
πU = (1− Q) · 2z¯qU 1
2z¯
+ (z¯2 − z¯2)qU 1
2z¯
= (1− Q)qU . (A3)
Because we obtain qU = 1− Q from (8), we can rearrange (A3) as (10b).
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
Hereafter, the new variable x ≡ 1z¯ is introduced. Note that x ∈ (N2 , N+ 1) fromAssumptions
1 and 2. First, we prove that πL(N, 0) ≥ πU(N − 1, 1). Let us deﬁne F(x) ≡ πL(N, 0) −
πU(N − 1, 1). From (10a) and (10b), we derive F(x) as
F(x) =
1
(N + 2)3
(x + 1)3 − 1
(N + 3)2
(2x − (N − 1))2. (B1)
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We obtain from (B1):
lim
x→−∞ F(x) = −∞ (B2a)
F
(
N
2
)
=
1
8
− 1
(N + 3)2
> 0, (B2b)
F(N + 1) = 1− 1 = 0, (B2c)
lim
x→∞ F(x) = ∞ > 0. (B2d)
Differentiating (B1) with respect to x yields
F′(x) =
3
(N + 2)3
(x + 1)2 − 4
(N + 3)2
(2x − (N − 1)). (B3)
From (B3), we have
F′(0) =
3
(N + 2)3
+
4
(N + 3)2
(N − 1) > 0, (B4a)
F′(N + 1) =
1− N
(N + 2)(N + 3)
< 0. (B4b)
Because F(x) is a cubic function of x and the sign of the coefﬁcient of x3 is positive, F(x) > 0
for any x ∈ (N2 , N + 1) from (B2) and (B4). This means that πL(N, 0) ≥ πU(N − 1, 1).
Next, we prove that πU(n,m) < πL(n+ 1,m− 1). We deﬁne G(x) ≡ πU(n,m)−πL(n+
1,m− 1). From (10a) and (10a), we derive G(x) as
G(x) =
1
(2(N + 1)− n)2 (2x − n)
2 − 1
(2N + 1− n)3 (x + (N − n))
3. (B5)
From (B5), we derive
lim
x→−∞G(x) = ∞, (B6a)
G(N + 1) = 1− 1 = 0, (B6b)
lim
x→∞G(x) = −∞. (B6c)
Differentiating (B5) with respect to x yields
G′(x) =
4
2(N + 1− n)2 (2x − n)−
3
(2N + 1− n)3 (x − (N − n))
2. (B7)
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From (B7), we have
G′(0) < 0, (B8a)
G′(N + 1) =
1
(2(N + 1)− n)(2N + 1− n) (2(N − 1)− n) > 0. (B8b)
G(x) is a cubic function of x, and the sign of the coefﬁcient of x3 is negative. Therefore, if
G(N2 ) < 0, then G(x) < 0 for any x ∈ (N2 , N + 1) from (B6) and (B8).
We show that G(N2 ) < 0. From (B5), we have
G
(
N
2
)
=
(2N + 1− n)3(N − n)2 − ( 32N − n)3(2(N + 1)− n)2
(2(N + 1)− n)2(2N + 1− n)3 . (B9)
We deﬁne the numerator of (B9) as a function of n, which is denoted by H(n). Because
sgn(G(N2 )) = sgn(H(n)), we examine the sign of H(n) for any n ∈ [0, N]. We calculate
H(0) and H(N) as follows.
H(0) = N2[(2N + 1)3 − 272 N(N + 1)2] = −N2
[ 11
2 N
3 + 15N2 + 152 N − 1
]
< 0, (B10a)
H(N) = − 18N3(N + 2)2 < 0. (B10b)
Differentiating H(n) with respect to n and arranging term yields
H′(n) =− ((2N + 1)− n)2(N − n)((7N + 2)− 5n)
+ ( 32N − n)2(2(N + 1)− n)((9N + 3)− 5n)
=− (n2 − 2(2N + 1)n+ (2N + 1)2)(5n2 − 2(6N + 1)n+ N(7N + 2))
+
(
n2 − 3Nn+ 94N2
)
(5n2 − (19N + 13)n+ 6(N + 1)(3N + 1)). (B11)
From (B11), we calculate H′(0) and H′(N)
H′(0) = N2(18− 252 N)− 32N − 2 < 0, (B12a)
H′(N) = 14N
2(N + 2)(4N + 3) > 0. (B12b)
Because (B11) shows that H′(n) is a cubic function of n and that the coefﬁcient of n3 is
−(2N + 1) < 0, (B12) implies that a critical value n˜ such that H′(n˜) = 0 uniquely exists in
the interval [0, N]. Therefore, we have
H′(n) ≤ 0 for any n ∈ [0, n˜], (B13a)
H′(n) > 0 for any n ∈ [n˜, N]. (B13b)
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From (B10) and (B13), therefore, we obtain H(n) < 0 for any n ∈ [0, N], which means that
G(N2 ) < 0.
Thus, we establish πU(n,m) < πL(n+ 1,m− 1), because G(x) < 0 for any x ∈ (N2 , N +
1).
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